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Law, Probability and Risk Advance Access originally published online on October 17, 2007
Law, Probability and Risk 2007 6(1-4):43-58; doi:10.1093/lpr/mgm014
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© The Author [2007]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

Reasoning and probability

John L. Pollock{dagger}

Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA

{dagger} Email: pollock{at}arizona.edu

Received on 24 May 2007. Accepted on 25 May 2007.


  Abstract

Reasoning justifies its conclusions to varying degrees, depending on the strength of the reasons and the justification of the evidence. It is often supposed that the resulting degrees of justification can be viewed as probabilities, but there are simple reasons why that cannot be right. This paper explores an alternative way of relating probabilities and degrees of justification.

Keywords: argument; evidence; probability; defeasible; reasoning

Presented at the workshop on ‘Graphic and visual representations of evidence and inference in legal settings’ at Cardozo School of Law, New York City, 28–29 January 2007.


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