Law, Probability and Risk Advance Access originally published online on October 17, 2007
Law, Probability and Risk 2007 6(1-4):295-310; doi:10.1093/lpr/mgm016
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© The Author [2007]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
Thinking beyond the shown: implicit inferences in evidence and argument

Quinnipiac University School of Law, 275 Mt. Carmel Avenue, Hamden, CT 06518, USA

New York Law School, 57 Worth Street, New York, NY 10012, USA
Email: neal.feigenson{at}quinnipiac.edu
Email: rsherwin{at}nyls.edu
Received on 24 February 2007. Revised on 29 May 2007. Accepted on 31 May 2007.
| Abstract |
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Visual representations are especially well suited to the construction of implicit meanings. Like advocates in other fields, lawyers use visual displays to prompt cognitive and emotional associations of which viewers may not be aware and which, consequently, they are less likely to evaluate critically. The authors review some of the psychological and rhetorical effects of visual representations in general, discuss several examples of how legal visual displays encourage audiences to draw implicit inferences and argue for the importance of heightened visual literacy in improving our ability to understand the meanings and implications of visual advocacy within the legal system.
Keywords: trials; advocacy; rhetoric; visual theory; psychology; evidence
Presented at the workshop on Graphic and visual representations of evidence and inference in legal settings at Cardozo School of Law, New York City, 28–29 January 2007.