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Law, Probability and Risk Advance Access originally published online on March 3, 2007
Law, Probability and Risk 2006 5(2):135-157; doi:10.1093/lpr/mgl015
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© The Author [2007]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

Case comment—United States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2005): A Collateral Attack on the Legal Maxim That Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt Is Unquantifiable?

Peter Tillers{dagger}

Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New York, USA

Jonathan Gottfried{ddagger}

Attorney, Friedman, Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP, New York, USA

{dagger} Email: peter{at}tillers.net

{ddagger} Email: jgottfried{at}fklaw.com

Received on 21 August 2006. Revised on 27 October 2006. Accepted on 30 October 2006.


  Abstract

There is a well-settled maxim that the standard of persuasion in criminal trials—proof beyond a reasonable doubt—is unquantifiable. However, the usual reasons given for the unquantifiability of reasonable doubt are unsatisfactory; and a recent case, United States v. Copeland, serves as a reminder that strong considerations favour quantification of at least some standards of persuasion. This comment attempts to bring greater clarity to the question of the advantages and disadvantages of some form of quantification of the reasonable doubt standard.

Keywords: evidence; inference; proof; standard of persuasion; proof beyond a reasonable doubt; mathematics in trials; proof in criminal trials; trial by mathematics; proof and mathematics


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