© 2003 by Oxford University Press
What we say we do on review, what we actually do on review, why they are so dissimilar, and how we manage not to notice
1 Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA
Agreeing with Mathieson and Gross observations in Review for Error, this comment explores the avowed focus on process in appellate review and questions the accuracy of the review-for procedural-errors model. After proposing addtional explanations for the disjuncture between the theory of appellate review and the practical influence of substantive concerns, the comment suggests further avenues of research, both empirical and psychological.
Keywords: appellate review; procedural error; neutral priciples; review; appeal; error; trial; finality; judges; advocacy; fiction
Received 22 September 2003. Revised 25 September 2003. Accepted 25 September 2003.